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February 20, 1987 Conference 
List 7, Sheet 4 
No. 86-1108-CSY 
Vermont (sentenced resp on the 
basis of his statements in the 
presentence report) 
v. 
Cox (claims Fifth Amendment 
violation) 
Cert to ~ - Sup. Ct. (Allen, 
CJ, Hill, Peck, Gibson, Hayes) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination ~oes not apply to statements 
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made by resp in a court-ordered presentence interview conducted 
after resp entered a no-contest plea. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELCM: Resp was charged with three 
counts of kidnapping. He entered no-contest pleas to three mis-
demeanor charges of simple assault in return for dismissal of the 
kidnapping charge. The tc ordered a presentence investigation. 
As part of the investigation, a probation officer interviewed 
resp, who was in jail awaiting sentencing. An investigator from 
the public defender's office was sent to assist resp, but had not 
arrived when the interview began. Resp asked to speak with the 
investigator before answering any questions. The probation offi-
cer told resp that she would not interview him at all if he in-
sisted on waiting for the investigator. The interview proceeded 
without the investigator. Resp made statements about his in-
volvement with drugs which were included in the presentence re-
port. The tc sentenced resp to three consecutive terms of 6 to 
12 months, in excess of the prosecutor's recommendation. At the 
sentencing hearing, the tc stated: 
"Your report indicates that you have had a substantial 
amount of contact with drugs and drug abuse in the 
past. Whether or not your trip to Vermont was a trav-
elling of a merchant, I don't know. From some of the 
things you said that it may have been." Petn 7a. 
Resp appealed the sentence on the ground that his state-
ments during the presentence interview were made involuntarily, 
after he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Vt. Sup. 
Ct. agreed. It is true that a plea of nolo contendere waives the 
privilege against self-incrimination as to that particular crime. 
See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (CAl 1973). 
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However, a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere may invoke the Fifth Amendment to prevent enhancement 
of his sentence. In this case, resp indicated that he was reluc-
tant to speak to the probation officer without the advice of the 
investigator from the public defender's office. The ct distin-
guished Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979), which held 
that a juvenile's request to see his probation officer did not 
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Determining whether a de-
fendant has invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege requires "an 
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation." Id., at 725. Although the investigator is not a 
lawyer, the circumstances suggest that resp wanted legal advice. 
Moreover, the investigator, unlike the probation officer in Mi-
chael C, clearly was the defendant's ally. Resp' s statements 
were involuntary because the probation officer presented resp, 
who was incarcerated, with a choice between doing without the 
investigator's assistance and forfeiting the interview. Resp's 
statements were not merely cumulative. A victim's statement in-
cluded in the PSI report contained some information about resp's 
drug-related activities, but resp's statements were more de-
tailed. The court remanded for preparation of a new presentence 
report and for resentencing. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this case presents an 
opportunity to decide whether the Fifth Amendment privilege ex-
tends to a non-capital, post-conviction, presentence interroga-
tion, a question expressly left open by Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454, 469 n. 13. (1981). Estelle v. Smith holds that the 
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Fifth Amendment pr iv il ege applies to a psychiatric examination 
admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial. The Court 
stated: "Of course, we do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment 
concerns are necessarily presented by all types of interviews and 
examinations that might be ordered or relied upon to inform a 
sentencing determination." Ibid. There is a conflict over 
whether Estel 1 e applies to non-capital sentencing proceedings. 
Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 576 (CA9 1982) ("neither 
Estelle itself, nor the general principles announced in Miranda, 
require that a convicted defendant be warned of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting to a 
routine, authorized presentence interview."); United States v. 
Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 431 (CA2 1985) (sentencing ct may not rely 
on statements made by defendant in competency examination in non-
capital proceeding); Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754, 765 (CA9 
1982) (Fifth Amendment applies where probation officer seeks a 
confession of additional criminal activity, and confession is 
used to enhance the sentence). It is true that the Vt. Sup. Ct. 
did not decide whether the presentence interview was a custodial 
interrogation. If it was, however, and if resp was entitled to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, it follows that the pro}?a-
tion officer was required to give the Miranda warnings. Four 
state appellate cts have held that Miranda warnings need not be 
given prior to a routine presentence investigation interview, 
petn 8 (citing cases from Ind., Cal., Pa. and Ky.). 
In general, a presentence report should contain as much 
information about the defendant's background as possible. The 
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Due Process Clause requires that information considered by the 
sentencer must be reasonably accurate. United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443 (1972). Any additional constitutional limitations 
on the gathering of information for sentencing would impair the 
rationality of the sentencing process. The Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege applies only to proceedings which carry a "danger to a wit-
ness forced to give testimony leading to the reflection of 'pen-
al ties affixed to criminal acts .••• '" Ullman v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 438-439, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 634 (1886). Once the defendant has admitted his guilt and 
awaits sentencing, he faces only the range of penal ties pre-
scribed by the statute, and so his statements cannot lead to an 
"enhanced" punishment. If the Vt. Sup. Ct.' s holding were fol-
lowed, it might lead to grants of immunity to defendants in order 
to obtain background information, an absurd result. Moreover, 
resp's general statements could not form the basis for additional 
er iminal charges. Petr also contends that resp' s decision to 
proceed with the interview was voluntary. 
Resp contends that a defendant who pleads guilty or nol o 
contendere may assert a Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent en-
hancement of his sentence or prosecution for other crimes. Unit-
ed States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1235 (CA9 1985); Jones v. 
Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (CA9 1982). In this case, resp asserted 
his privilege, and then was misled into making damaging state-
ments. Under Vermont law, resp's statements could be admitted 
against him as evidence of additional crimes. The Vt. Sup. Ct. 
did not hold that resp. was entitled to Miranda warnings, and 
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therefore that question is not presented by this case. This case 
presents only a fact-bound application of the settled rule that a 
convicted defendant has the right to remain silent when inter-
viewed by a probation officer. The probation officer's coercive 
tactic rendered resp' s statements involuntary. In any event, 
whether the statements were voluntary is a fact-bound issue. 
4. DISCUSSION: There does appear to be some uncertainty 
among the lower cts over the extent to which the Fifth Amendment 
privilege applies to presentence interviews. The Court may wish 
to grant cert. to determine whether the privilege applies to any 
post-conviction statement that might result in a longer sentence. 
If the privilege applies, it seems to follow that probation offi-
cers must give Miranda warnings before conducting routine 
presentence interviews, at least when the convicted defendant is 
in custody. Apparently no ct. has reached this result, and the 
Vermont Sup. Ct. did not discuss Miranda. On balance, I suggest 
waiting until a conflict develops on the Miranda question. There 
is no doubt that a convicted defendant may refuse to answer ques-
tions at a presentence interview, with or without the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. Similarly, there is no doubt that a con-
victed defendant may voluntarily provide information whether or 
not he can claim the privilege. Thus, the question may not arise 
with great frequency. 
The ct's conclusion that resp invoked the Fifth Amendment 
is doubtful in light of Fare v. Michael c. However, that holding 
is inherently fact-bound, and petr has not asked the Court to 
review it. It is also doubtful whether resp' s waiver of his 
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Fifth Amendment privilege was involuntary. Resp retained a right 
of allocution before sentencing. But this is also a fact-bound 
question. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
February 11, 1987 Long Opinion in petn 
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